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Rhode Island has not shared equally in New England's economic resurgence of recent years.
A major reevaluation of the state 's economic malaise in 1982-84 resulted in a $250 million pro-
gram called the Greenhouse Compact to improve business in the state. Initially supported in
polls by a two-to-one margin, the Compact was defeated overwhelmingly when it went to a
statewide referendum. The timing of the referendum and mistakes in the public relations strat-
egy and in the structure of the Compact all played a role in the outcome, but postelection polls
showed that defeat, based on a massive shift of undecided voters, ultimately revolved around a
lack of trust in government and in the states leadership. Rhode Islanders made an understand-
able choice which unfortunately led to the loss of a great opportunityfor the state.
In recent years, New England has acquired a reputation as the glamorous new high
technology alternative to the Sun Belt. Massachusetts and Connecticut, in particular,
have seen an influx of businesses, jobs, and young, upwardly mobile executives pursu-
ing fast-lane careers.
Not so Rhode Island. Rather, the state has stagnated over the past decade, barely
replacing jobs lost in its aging manufacturing base. And the jobs that remain make
Rhode Island manufacturing wages the third lowest in the nation. Also, owing to the
lack of attractive employment opportunities for its young people, Rhode Island has
the third highest proportion of people over age sixty-five of any state in the country;
its educated youth are leaving for greener pastures.
Thus, as a Rhode Islander and a father, I embraced the opportunity in 1982 to
volunteer my time as a consultant to a special commission created for the purpose of
recommending ways to end Rhode Island's economic malaise. My job was to coordi-
nate the research and writing of the commission's report.
The Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission (SDC) was composed of
nineteen members, with an advisory committee of another fifty members. The partic-
ipants were drawn from business, finance, organized labor, higher education, public
service, and environmental advocacy. In addition, there was a staff of seventy people
who did the research and writing of the draft report (this group was formed and
directed by me). With the help of the advisory committee, the commission amended
the draft and came up with a document that met with their satisfaction.
Ira Magaziner is president of Telesis, Inc., an international consultingfirm that provides business strategy
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While this document was being written, pieces of it were circulated for assessment
among people who had expertise in the various topics— such as taxation, environ-
mental issues, and so on— that it evaluated. Approximately one hundred reviewers
took part in this phase of the process. The final draft was composed by the seventy-
person staff and the commission. All of this occurred between October 1982 and
October 1983. At the end of those twelve months, the report, known as the Green-
house Compact, was introduced to the public. It was one thousand pages long and
contained a thorough analysis of the state's economy, along with a series of seventy
recommendations. ' All the participants in the process that led to the final report
either volunteered their own time— or, as was the case with consultants, researchers,
and secretaries from my company, Telesis—had their time volunteered for them by
their employers. .Q
Just as no two businesses are exactly alike, no two states are exactly the same in
their economic problems. The substance of the program developed not from any
ideology but from a pragmatic consideration of what would be required to make a
significant difference in the Rhode Island economy in the coming decade. In a state
not known for harmonious relations among business, government, and labor, the
achievement of a broad consensus among commission members on such a sweeping
program was viewed as a significant milestone.
Between October 1983 and March 1984, the report won endorsement from over
fifty leadership groups, including the state's Chambers of Commerce and its AFL-
CIO; the League of Cities and Towns (composed of mayors and town administra-
tors); the presidents of all the universities and colleges in the state, as well as all the
college student councils; the Hospital Association of Rhode Island and the Rhode
Island State Nurses' Association; the Black Ministers Alliance; the Gray Panthers; the
Vietnam Era Veterans Association; and others.
In April 1984, the Greenhouse Compact passed both houses of the state legislature
by substantial margins— 81 to 7 in the House of Representatives and 36 to 13 in the
Senate. (In Rhode Island, legislation must pass in both the state Senate and House
before being brought to the public in the form of a referendum.) The program won
bipartisan support from most political leaders in the state, including the Republican
and Democratic candidates for governor and the state's Republican and Democratic
U.S. senators. The commission then took the Compact to an all-or-nothing binding
referendum. The referendum wasn't essential for enactment of the program, since the
state treasury had a surplus that could have financed all of it; but it was important,
the commissioners felt, to engage Rhode Islanders in the process. Between mid
October 1983 and mid June 1984, commissioners volunteered their time to talk and
debate with voters in almost eight hundred meetings held around the state. Polls were
taken regularly to gauge public opinion, and up to the last three weeks before the
vote, they consistently gave the program a two-to-one favorable margin.
On June 12, 1984, Rhode Islanders went to the polls. The program was slaughtered.
The defeat of the Greenhouse Compact was an enormous disappointment to all of
us who had given two years of our time to the commission, but it didn't come as a
complete surprise. Events of the month prior to the referendum played a dispropor-
tionate role in the final determination. This article explains the Compact's defeat; but
before going into that, I will give a brief description of the program's substance.
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The Greenhouse Compact
After studying Rhode Island's economic status in depth, the individuals on the SDC
agreed that a major financial investment would be required to redress the cumulative
problems that had contributed to Rhode Island's stagnation. They found that over 60
percent of the state's manufacturing businesses were seriously threatened by foreign
competition; it was clear that Rhode Island needed new products and new businesses.
The trend, however, was in the opposite direction. Rhode Island entrepreneurs
were starting businesses in other states, and the substantial venture capital firms
located in Rhode Island were lending out of state. State-based firms that were
expanding were creating more jobs outside Rhode Island than at home. Finally,
50 important research in several fields was being conducted in universities and hospitals
around the state, but Rhode Island businesses were not making use of it. In order to
reverse this pattern, the commission worked out a program of incentives to encourage
the development of new products and industries; to create an infrastructure for the
development of new products and industries; and to improve the general business
climate.
Of the seventy recommendations that were made, some of the more significant
ones were as follows: (1) the creation of research "greenhouses" to conduct applied
research in areas where Rhode Island universities and hospitals were already strong.
These would serve as a magnet for internal companies already working in those areas
and would stimulate the creation of new companies in the state; (2) an incentive pro-
gram to foster expansion of firms within the state; (3) a program to encourage Rhode
Island firms to share the risk of associated investments in order to pioneer new prod-
ucts and markets; (4) elimination of all capital gains taxes on profits received from
new business start-ups; and (5) the granting of offsets against the state personal
income tax for entrepreneurs and investors. With respect to the general business
climate, the commission advised reform of the state unemployment and workers
compensation systems to reduce costs; establishment of a state office to cut red tape
in business regulation; and significant education and training programs to upgrade
the skills of the Rhode Island population.
The Greenhouse Compact called for an investment of $250 million over seven
years— $160 million in direct financing and the rest in tax cuts and loans for busi-
nesses. The goal was to stimulate a total investment of $750 million over the seven-
year duration of the program. The Compact was to be administered by an indepen-
dent body consisting of nineteen members from the private sector and two
representatives from the legislature. The structure of this second commission would
parallel that of the original one, although the appointments made to it would be on a
rotating basis, with the term of service lasting one, two, or three years (a provision
was included for the reappointment of members). A paid staff would be hired about
two months after a positive referendum vote, and the new commission would con-
tribute a significant effort in the first year and a half of its existence. But the new
commission would survive only as long as the program was in operation; it would act
as a board of directors and a catalyst for development, not as another permanent
layer of bureaucracy.
The Will of the Voters— An Overview
Two polls were taken by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., of Washington,
D.C., to register voter attitudes toward the Compact. In December 1983, when asked
how they would cast their ballot if the election were held that day, Rhode Islanders
indicated they would vote for the program by just under a two-to-one margin. In mid
March 1984, another Hart poll indicated a favorable vote by slightly more than a
two-to-one margin. (These majorities included pollees who said they would probably
vote for the Compact as well as those who expressed a definite intention to do so.
Ultimately, the fate of the program was in the hands of the "probables" and those
who were undecided.) In early June, however, a poll by Alpha Research Associates,
Inc., of Providence showed a negative result of 42 percent against the program, 34 51
percent in favor of it; but even those figures did not foreshadow the ultimate margin
of defeat.
Voting behavior is always complex and rarely lends itself to easy analysis. Two
major postelection polls— one by a team from Providence College and the other by
Alpha Research Associates for a Brown University study team— were conducted to
assess the results of the referendum. The thousands of phone calls made by Green-
house supporters in the weeks preceding the election also provided some insight into
shifting voter dispositions. Finally, in seeking a deeper understanding than polls or
phone calls can provide, I have talked with many people, both supporters and oppo-
nents of the Compact, since the election.
From very early on, two distinct voter groups emerged: one of hard-core support-
ers, the other of hard-core opponents. In the December 1983 poll, 16 percent of
respondents said they definitely planned to vote yes; 12 percent registered a definite
intention to vote no. Supporters of the program included people who were close to
the Greenhouse process; people who were close to people who were close to the pro-
cess; and others whose imagination had been captured by the possibility of actually
effecting a significant improvement in the state economy. On the other side were the
opponents. The Compact was a public program created to provide incentives for
industrial development, and those whose ideologies were in conflict with this type of
agenda were set in their intention to vote against it. This included a group on the
right of the political spectrum who opposed government intervention in the economy,
as well as a group on the left who opposed a so-called welfare program for business.
The former felt that labor had made inadequate concessions in the Compact; the lat-
ter felt that labor had conceded too much. The hard-core opposition also included
people who after years of disenchantment had finally become alienated from govern-
ment in the state, along with people who were fed up with taxes and saw the Com-
pact as another tax program. Additionally, there was a small group of businessmen
who did not wish to see wages rise in the state (though of course their opposition was
never explicitly stated in these terms).
The figures for these two crystallized groups remained relatively stable, increasing
by only a few percentage points, to 21 percent in favor and 18 percent opposed, by
mid March 1984. Though they were responsible for much of the noise on both sides
of the debate and received most of the coverage by the news media, the program's
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vocal and confirmed proponents and opponents had little to do with the actual out-
come of the election. The most important group in this regard was the "silent major-
ity," which represented 72 percent of voters in December 1983 and 61 percent in
March 1984. In December, 33 percent of this group listed themselves as probable yes
voters, 13 percent as probable no voters, and 26 percent as undecided. By March, the
figures had tilted even more in favor of the program: 39 percent were probable yes
voters, 12 percent were probable no voters, and 10 percent were undecided. Yet in the
end, virtually all of these people voted no.
Throughout the year, the attitude of these swing voters toward the Compact had
been both positive and negative. Until May, the positive outweighed the negative for
the most part. By early June, the negative won out.
ry The prevailing view of the Compact disposed a majority of the swing group toward
a positive ballot. Conveyed in the polls and in conversations during the statewide
meetings, it can be summarized as follows: "The state has economic problems and
some new effort is required to remedy the situation. These Greenhouse people and
the governor seem to have put a lot of work into this program, and they appear to be
intelligent and honest. Maybe it will work; let's give it a shot." But the seed of defeat
for the Compact had been planted long before its initiation, then harvested over
many seasons of disappointment and disillusionment. Despite their inclination to vote
for the program, the swing group expressed a number of concerns, the substance of
which follows, that severely undermined their positive feelings: "This program
involves spending a lot of money and it's awfully complicated. In Rhode Island, you
can't trust that a program like this won't become politicized and result in the power-
ful giving out money to their friends and creating patronage jobs, or, worse, stealing
the people's money." In early polls, 65 percent of all voters said they agreed with the
statement that "there is too much political corruption in Rhode Island for a program
like the Qreenhouse to be administered honestly and effectively."
The Three Debates
The controversy over the Greenhouse Compact occurred on three levels, and the
postmortems that took place varied according to the perspective of the participant.
On the most superficial level, the debate centered on ideology, pitting advocates of
industrial policy or government intervention in the economy against supporters of
laissez-faire economics policies. Many reports in the national media posed the issues
within this framework; some academics interested in the national aspects of the
debate did likewise, as did some opponents of the Compact within Rhode Island. The
presentation of the debate in the national media was probably further influenced by
my presence as a consultant to the Greenhouse and my coauthorship with Robert
Reich of Minding America's Business, a book which advocates a U.S. industrial
policy. 2
National opponents of industrial policy initially attacked the program, in many
cases without knowing much about it. Arthur Laffer, in a speech made in Rhode
Island, lambasted the Compact while admitting he had not read it. 3 Forbes magazine
sent a reporter to write a news article about the program; instead, an editorial-style
piece appeared which ignored direct quotations from most business supporters and
became an anti-Compact diatribe. 4
After the April 1984 vote in the state legislature indicated that the referendum
would very likely pass, the national anti-industrial policy media switched gear and
downplayed the Compact, depicting it not as a bona fide industrial policy but as just
some specific programs created for a Rhode Island environment which in no way
could be used as a model for other, larger states or for the country as a whole. Yet
some of the same publications that had deemphasized the Compact's relevance fol-
lowing the legislative vote trumpeted the final defeat as a popular and representative
referendum which clearly demonstrated that the nation's people would hate any type
of industrial policy. 5
Actually, there were many members of the Strategic Development Commission
who were not in favor of a coherent national industrial policy. A majority of Com-
pact proponents in the business community were most certainly President Reagan
supporters who would oppose such a policy and who would probably count them-
^
selves as conservatives whose views on many issues were parallel to those of the plan's
conservative opponents. The fact of the matter is that the Greenhouse Compact was a
program designed by about 250 people of diverse backgrounds and political views
whose priority was the formulation of a viable economic strategy for Rhode Island.
The average Rhode Islander and even the vast majority of people actively engaged in
a dialogue about the Compact didn't care a hill of beans about contentions over
industrial policy or market imperfections or the efficiency of public/ private partner-
ships. Rather, this ideological argument was carried out on the news pages of the
Washington Post, on the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal, and in a few aca-
demic journals around the country. It had very little to do with Rhode Island.
The second level of debate did take place in Rhode Island, and it revolved around
the specifics of the legislation that put forward the recommendations. Hundreds and
probably thousands of Rhode Islanders actively debated the specifics of the Compact
between October 1983 and April 1984 at public meetings, through op-ed pieces in the
newspapers, and in the legislature. Besides the groups mentioned earlier— such as the
state's Chambers of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, and the Black Ministers Alliance
—
others, including the ACLU, the State Advisory Commission on the Status of
Women, the Community Labor Coalition, and a large number of businessmen, union
members, and citizens of varied backgrounds voiced objections to particular aspects
of the program, made proposals for amendments, and argued in the legislature both
for and against many of the Compact's provisions. Hearings were held around the
state. Various legislative committees were given different pieces of the program to
debate; groups and individuals (including legislators) filed opinions for proposed
modifications. The process was a healthy one, and the debate resulted in many
changes to the original proposals. Most of these changes, in my view, were improve-
ments.
At the end of this process, many of the participants decided to overlook the criti-
cisms they still may have had and vote for the Compact. Some, feeling that their con-
cerns had not been sufficiently addressed, decided to vote against it. Those legislators
who had been actively involved in the public debate decided in the end to vote for the
Compact. Though some of them were in fact against it and voted favorably only to
send it to a referendum, the margins of passage in April 1984, along with the individ-
ual conversations we had with legislators, convince me that the Compact would have
passed in the state legislature— albeit by smaller margins— even if legislators had not
been voting in anticipation of a referendum.
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The third debate, and the one that ultimately counted, was the debate before the
public. An intense discussion on the specifics of a program, when carried out in the
media and among those who surround the State House, can create the impression
that everyone in the state has a keen interest in what is being discussed. In fact, most
issues do not stir the public into detailed discussion, and the Compact was no excep-
tion. For the majority of Rhode Island citizens, the ideological debates about indus-
trial policy may as well have been taking place on the moon. Even the arguments
over details were not really to the point. Very few Rhode Islanders voted for or
against the Compact because they thought that the research greenhouse proposals
were not structured quite right or that the entrepreneurs' incentive programs were too
large or even that unemployment compensation proposals were too pro labor or too
54 pro business.
All the analysts of poll data, all the postmortem discussions, and all the experiences
of the "campaign" indicate that for most voters, the decision about the Greenhouse
Compact ultimately revolved around the issue of trust.
The majority of voters felt that some course of action to improve the state's econ-
omy was needed and that public action was justified in support of economic devel-
opment; the majority were even prepared to invest financially in these changes. Dur-
ing the first seven months following the Compact's release, most voters were prepared
to support it in the referendum even though they found it complex and had doubts
about its size, its financing (the tax and bonds), and its structure.
The explanation for voters' loss of trust in the Greenhouse process and therefore in
its ability to work lies in a combination of factors: flaws in the program's proposed
structure and financing; mistakes in the way it was presented to the public; and unre-
lated events that raised the fear of public corruption— a fear set against the backdrop
of public abuses which have marred Rhode Island's recent history. The public
response can be summarized by a slogan that emerged on radio talk shows during the
debate': "Clean house and then we will have a Greenhouse."
The Mistakes
Voting in a referendum, as many have observed, is different from voting for political
candidates in an election. People often have some misgivings about both political
candidates in a race, yet in most cases will still vote for one of them. Since voting
machines do not record the degree of enthusiasm with which levers are pulled, it is
not possible to say how many votes were cast for candidate X merely because voters
disliked or distrusted candidate Y.
In a referendum, on the other hand, misgivings lead people to vote no. A no vote is
a safe vote.
The Substantive Errors
The commission that produced the Greenhouse Compact was appointed by the gov-
ernor but had no legislative authority. For the purpose of administering the program,
a formally constituted legislative body was required. This second commission was to
consist of representatives from business, labor, academia, and the state legislature. It
was to receive almost all of its funding up front and have significant autonomy from
the legislative budgetary process. Although some legislative and executive oversight
was to be provided, the commission would be autonomous in most important
respects. The intention was to secure freedom from political influences that might be
exerted on a year-to-year basis, as well as to provide long-term continuity to the
administration of the program so that private-sector investors would feel they could
trust commitments made by the Greenhouse commission. Decisions about the struc-
ture of the new commission were influenced by the desire to assuage fears of political
influence. In retrospect, however, it is clear that the structure chosen did not have the
desired effect, and, in terms of engendering public support, may actually have been
the worst possible choice that could have been made. For the recent history of such
semi-autonomous bodies in Rhode Island has only resulted in public distrust.
A number of quasi public bodies have been set up over the years in Rhode Island
to administer programs. Their history has been tainted, at best. Some have become
dumping grounds for political patronage; others have become hotbeds of corruption.
Over the past two years, a group of indictments resulted from a scandal involving the jj
staff of the Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation (RIHMFC),
which is responsible for administering low-interest federal mortgages in the state.
Prior to the advent of the Compact, the executive director of the Rhode Island Turn-
pike and Bridge Authority had been indicted on account of alleged extreme liberties
he had taken with his expense account. These are only two recent examples of the
checkered history of such entities; there are many more. 6
We who had volunteered our time to the SDC could not understand at first how
voters could distrust our motives, since we ourselves had done nothing to engender
distrust; but given the context in which we were working, such a response was quite
understandable. Many voters feared that the legislated commission would turn out to
be just another quasi public agency with large sums of money that would be
mishandled. Ironically, the action we took to mitigate this fear actually helped fuel it.
The second mistake we made was in regard to financing. The commission asked for
a one-time tax to fund a portion of the program and suggested that much of the
remainder be financed with bonds. The motivation for this was twofold: to keep
monetary decisions about the program separate from ongoing legislative decisions
about the funding of other programs; and to ask Rhode Islanders to make an explicit
sacrifice in order to fund the economic development of the state.
By the time the report was issued, the public was well aware that there was going
to be a substantial surplus in the state budget. An unpopular tax surcharge had been
levied in the previous year during the depths of the recession, and the recovery had
produced revenue surpluses in the state sales and income tax accounts. There was
enough money in the state treasury to fund the entire seven-year package. Even more:
as part of his budget message in 1984, the governor proposed a tax cut equal to $27
million per year while requesting the bond issue and one-time tax to fund the Com-
pact. The cut was enacted, and by the end of that fiscal year, it became evident that
even further tax cuts were possible, and these also were enacted. A portion of the
state surplus could have been donated to the Compact with only legislative
approval— no one-time tax, no bond issue with associated interest payments, and no
referendum.
In view of these facts, the commission's financial recommendations for the Com-
pact seem politically naive. But we believed it was proper to go to the voters with the
program even though there was no requirement for this procedure; I still believe it
was unequivocally the right thing to do. We also felt strongly about keeping our
funding separate from the funding for other programs and agreed that a positive vote
on a one-time tax would provide a symbolic message to the nation that Rhode
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Islanders were prepared to impose a levy on themselves in the interest of economic
development. Such a move, we thought, would send a clear signal to the outside
world about our commitment to turn around the state's anti-economic development
image.
But again our good intentions boomeranged. The inclusion of the one-time tax
shifted debate in the media about the Compact as a jobs program to debate about the
Compact as a tax program. Owing to the interest payments associated with the
bonds, the bond issue inflated the stated cost of the program, and it also incurred a
public outcry about banks supporting the Compact in order to obtain profits from
floating the bonds. In early polls, 65 percent of voters said that it was wrong for the
commission to ask for a one-time tax when the state government had a surplus,
j^ Compact proponents made a third mistake when they tried to rush the referendum
election. Once more, the motives were good but the decision itself did not mesh with
the mood of the people. November 1984 would have been the obvious time to sched-
ule the referendum election; a positive vote at this time would have meant ratification
of new commission members in early 1985 and a gearing up of commission activities
in the spring of 1985. But members of the SDC did not want to wait that long. The
investment upturn that had occurred across the country in the winter of 1983 and the
first half of 1984 was cause for optimism; however, the fear of a recession or at least a
slowdown of investment sometime in 1985 was shared by many. 7 Commission
members also feared that waiting until November would tie up the program in the
political issues of the 1984 elections. Anxious to avoid this circumstance and to ride
the investment boom, the SDC recommended a special election in February or
March 1984 to vote on the Compact. A special election was held, though not until
June.
To a suspicious public, the move for a special election seemed like an attempt to
railroad the program through. Both the suggested timing and the special-election
mechanism itself contributed to this impression and stimulated the fear that support-
ers would be able to bring out people and win on a small turnout.
The Procedural Errors
Mistakes were also made in the presentation of the Compact to the public. Some mis-
takes were major, some were minor, but it all added up to a poor effort. For exam-
ple, the program was introduced as a package— a compact among business, labor,
education, and government leaders who normally are at war with each other. The
purpose of this strategy was to preclude these groups from causing the whole pro-
gram to unravel through efforts to delete elements not to their liking. To the public
perception, however, the package appeared to be an all-or-nothing, take-it-or-leave-it
proposition negotiated among elites, with insufficient opportunity provided for modi-
fication by the people.
In fact, the SDC had always understood that changes would be made through citi-
zen input in the legislative process, and it had scheduled the eight hundred statewide
meetings to encourage such input. Unfortunately, the all-or-nothing image stuck with
the package, and so did the public resentment it engendered.
The commission had based its public-relations strategy on small-group meetings
around the state and on meetings with leadership groups to seek endorsements. The
idea of the small-group meetings came out of our feeling that the program was too
complex and too important to be reduced to thirty-second commercials; we wanted
to spend a few hours with voters at their clubs, churches, social and professional
groups, unions, and so on. to discuss it in detail.
The meetings with leadership groups were organized on the assumption that people
who did not have the time or interest to study the program directly would be influ-
enced by the opinions of those they had elected to various positions, whether in their
unions, their Chambers of Commerce, their State Nurses' Association, or other
groups.
As it turned out, both kinds of meetings, though necessary, were not in themselves
enough to influence passage of the referendum. A poll taken by the Providence Col-
lege team in mid June 1984. after the referendum election, showed that only 6 percent
of those who voted had ever attended either type of meeting (though this was ob-
scured by the fact that of those who did attend, many had gone to more than one
meeting). Further, when asked whether they were aware that leadership groups sup- 57
ported the Compact. 90 percent of respondents answered in the affirmative; but when
asked whether this support had influenced their vote, only 11 percent said it had
influenced them to vote positively. Sixty-nine percent said it had not affected their
vote at all; and 20 percent said that the support of the leadership groups had influ-
enced them to vote negatively.
Perhaps the commission's biggest procedural errors— those which had the greatest
effect ultimately— were made three weeks before the election, when the public was
beginning to focus on the vote more directly. These errors had to do with the com-
mission appointments.
In order to allay fears that the program would be administered by "political hacks"
and in order to initiate an open process, the governor and the legislative leadership
had promised to make known the names of commission appointees prior to the vote
so that people would know who their choices were. Through the enabling legislation,
the governor. House Speaker, and Senate majority leader (all Democrats) were to
share in the making of appointments to the new commission. Altogether, twenty-one
commissioners were to be appointed: nineteen from the private sector, and two legis-
lators from the public sector (one from the Senate and one from the House). The
governor and legislative leaders conferred with the leaders of the original commission
about their decisions, and two issues emerged in these discussions: the representation
of women and minorities on the commission, and selection of the two legislators.
None of the appointees to the original commission had been members of minority
groups (though there was minority representation on the advisory committee), and
only two of the nineteen members had been women. The lack of representation had
brought on protest from these communities. Within the SDC, there were differences
of opinion on this issue. Some believed that women and minorities should be better
represented on the new commission; others were more concerned with regional mix,
with representation from various elements of the business community, and so on.
Discussion about selection of the two legislators centered on whether the House
Speaker and Senate majority leader, as the two most influential members of these
bodies, should appoint themselves to the new commission. Those in favor of this idea
believed that the self-appointments would demonstrate the importance that the legis-
lature placed on the program; others thought the move would run the risk of politi-
cizing the program in the minds of the voters.
I supported greater representation for women and minorities on the new commis-
sion as well as the appointments of the Speaker and majority leader. I lost the argu-
ment I should have won and won the argument I should have lost. Only three women
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commissioners and one minority commissioner were appointed, and the Speaker and
majority leader did appoint themselves. Announcement of these appointments created
a loud public protest that dominated television and newspaper coverage of the refer-
endum election for most of the three weeks prior to the event. The State Advisory
Commission on the Status of Women and the Black Ministers Alliance eventually
endorsed the Compact and urged a yes vote, but the enthusiasm of their membership
waned, clearly from the lack of representation. The initial protests of these groups
received front-page coverage, but their endorsements, when they came, went virtually
unreported.
That dispute had an unquestionably detrimental effect on the fate of the Compact,
but the real furor erupted over the two legislative appointments. The Republican
58 candidate for governor (now incumbent) Edward DiPrete, who had declared his sup-
port for the program, publicly denounced the self-appointments of the two Demo-
cratic legislative leaders (who were also supporters of the program) and demanded
that they resign and appoint one Republican in their stead. The controversy raged for
almost two weeks, with the Democratic legislative leaders refusing to bow to the
wishes of the Republican gubernatorial candidate.
Even when voters were unaware of the specifics of the feud, they knew that politi-
cal squabbling was engulfing the Compact. Phone calls made to voters by Compact
supporters during this time revealed a significant erosion of confidence, as people
reacted to what they considered the politicization of the entire undertaking. It was
clear that continued publicity of this conflict would cause the program's defeat. A
compromise reached with the Republican and Democratic leadership established that
the Democratic Speaker and majority leader would be retained on the commission,
while the two Republican minority leaders would be added, thus increasing the mem-
bership of the commission by two seats.
But the agreement had the appearance of a political deal struck behind closed
doors, one that would merely expand the size of the group that would be administer-
ing $250 million; and it signified to the public that political deal-making and a wil-
lingness to bend the rules (the composition and size of the commission) would be as
typical of the body administering the Greenhouse Compact as it had been of many
previous bodies of the same type. So the last-ditch attempt to resolve the problem
only made it worse. Both sides finally agreed to support the compromise and go all
out to help secure passage of the referendum, but it was too late. The public debate
was over, but its effect on the people of Rhode Island had been devastating.
Other Problems
Our mistakes were intensified by a series of events over which the commission had no
control. The mayor of Providence was indicted and removed from office in the
months just before the referendum. 8 Indictments of three city officials in the Depart-
ment of Public Works were made known on the day of the vote, with an announce-
ment that one of them was to have been a referendum poll watcher that day. 9 In the
last weeks before the election, I made a number of speeches, particularly at senior
citizen centers, in support of the Compact. (Senior citizens made up an estimated 55
percent of the vote on the day of the referendum.) During the course of my talks, the
indictments— even though they were completely unrelated to the program— were
brought up repeatedly as evidence of why the Compact could not succeed.
By the time the vote was taken, many people were in no mood to approve large
sums of money to be administered by the state's establishment. In the December and
March Hart polls, voters had expressed the belief that children and the unemployed
would receive the most benefit from passage of the Greenhouse Compact. But a
majority of voters queried in exit polls by the Providence College pollsters said that
the greatest beneficiaries would be politicians and big business.
The organized ideological opponents of the Compact were active and highly visible
for the last six months of the effort, but they had little effect on the outcome; they
mostly were preaching to their own converts. It was the naivete and miscalculations
of the Compact's supporters, combined with the unhappy timing of unrelated events,
that in the end sounded the death knell for the Greenhouse Compact.
In retrospect, it is hard to blame the people of Rhode Island for the judgment they <-g
made. A raft of new additional scandals involving broad sectors of the state's public
and private communities have emerged over the past eighteen months. 10 Some of
these scandals have centered around quasi public boards whose structure was similar
to that of the SDC.
Those of us who were closely involved with the SDC were too immersed in it to
imagine that anyone could project onto our effort the kinds of problems that had
plagued other state endeavors. We also didn't realize that most people perceived the
entire undertaking as remote, hard to comprehend, and difficult to distinguish from
other less worthy activities, especially given the mistakes described earlier.
Even though I am fully convinced that the Compact, if enacted into law, would
have had a very positive effect on the state's economy, I can easily understand why
most people ultimately decided not to vote for it.
Two questions have been asked frequently since the defeat of the program: How
could people as successful as those who worked on the Greenhouse Compact have
made the mistakes described here? and, What would I do differently if I had it to do
all over again?
Why the Mistakes?
A year of intensive study had been required to formulate the recommendations that
became the Greenhouse Compact. In contrast, discussions about how to organize and
finance the commission and how to present the package to the public lasted less than
a month— in hindsight, clearly too short a time.
Even more to the point, almost all of the individuals who worked on the Compact
were simultaneously performing full-time jobs as heads of companies or unions or
institutions of education. All of the commission members had put an exhausting year
into the writing of the report, with an especially intense effort required in the four
months between July and October of 1983. Being relatively inexperienced in the pub-
lic arena, we were simply not prepared for the tremendous demand that would be
made on our time during the nine months of public debate about the Compact.
Commission members attended about eight hundred public meetings; held numerous,
long sessions with legislators and with dozens of interest groups that were debating
the Compact; worked on writing and rewriting legislation; and held many strategy
sessions.
My own business required me to make many trips during the months of the Com-
pact's promotion: four to the Far East, five to Europe, two to Latin America, and
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numerous trips around the United States. I was forced to be absent for seventeen
days in May. The travel schedules of the commission chairman, the governor, and
myself prevented us from meeting together during the four weeks before the
appointments were made to the commission, which contributed to the mistakes made
in that process. In February, it had looked as though the election would be held in
early May, so we all postponed necessary travel until late May. No one foresaw that
the election would be in June, and that the end of May would become the most cru-
cial period of all, when public support unraveled.
These observations do not provide an excuse for the mistakes that were made, but
they do go some way toward explaining them. The Compact stirred up all the emo-
tions of a political campaign— or perhaps more— and the situation was further com-
plicated by the fact that positions were spelled out in minute detail instead of being
painted with the broad brush strokes of the usual campaign. A normal campaign is
hard enough, even when conducted by full-time candidates and staff. We were part-
time amateurs.
Lessons to Be Learned
After the defeat of the Greenhouse Compact, I talked with a number of officials in
other states, most of whom suggested that the program was far too complex to have
gone to a referendum. They said that any need for a referendum had been disposed of
by the program's success in uniting a disparate and wide range of leadership groups
in a normally divided state, and by its passage in the state legislature by significant
majorities; these things alone, in their opinion, would have been considered extraor-
dinary accomplishments, and the program would have won the hearts of the people
as they experienced its beneficial effects over the years.
While I understand the pragmatism embodied in their comments, I do not agree. I
believe that any program as far-reaching as the Greenhouse Compact should be put
to the people for approval as a matter of principle. Further, in my judgment the pro-
gram could have succeeded at the polls had we proceeded differently with it:
The Compact should have been brought to the public as a draft, not as a fait
accompli, and the public meetings should have been overtly designed as a forum
for amending the proposals.
The election should have been held in November 1984; this would have avoided
rushing the process, and voters wouldn't have felt they were being pressured.
The financing for the program should have been requested incrementally over the
life of the Compact, with some means of guaranteeing its continuity; this would
have eliminated the necessity of forcing people to vote for all the funds up front.
More checks and balances and more legislative oversight should have been built
into the administrative structure of the program to ensure that it would be admin-
istered meritoriously.
The SDC should have been made more representative of all Rhode Islanders.
Communication with the public at large should have been more comprehensive.
In the final analysis, it is almost impossible to enact a program of very broad sig-
nificance unless citizens have a certain basic level of trust in their government, and
the deep-seated suspicion of corruption and patronage in the state did not lay a good
foundation for the Greenhouse Compact. Nevertheless, if the December, March, and
May polls were accurate, the program might well have succeeded with the voters of
Rhode Island had it not been marred by the fatal flaws discussed in this article. And I
still am convinced that it would have made an overwhelming positive difference to
Rhode Island's future.
Perhaps the most poignant moment of our two years of work occurred two days
before the vote, on Sunday, June 10.
Most people who had been closely involved with the Compact knew by then that it
would be defeated. But their dedication was still strong, and they decided on the Fri-
day preceding the referendum that they would exert one last effort to show the people
of Rhode Island the depth of feeling that supported the Compact and the unlikely
alliances that had formed to propose it. 61
On one day's notice, leaders of the fifty or so groups that had endorsed the Com-
pact were asked to come to a march in support of it. The architects of the procession
had drawn up a plan for about one hundred people to march five miles from Slater
Mill in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the birthplace of the U.S. industrial revolution and
the town where the Compact legislation had been signed, to the Roger Williams
Monument in Providence, the site of the founding of Rhode Island and the city
where the Compact had been unveiled. Despite the short notice and despite the 105
degree heat, not one person who had been asked to participate and who was in town
that day failed to march. A few people— such as Father Thomas R. Peterson, the
highly respected president of Providence College— even flew back from out of town
to take part.
Because of the heat, the streets were deserted. The procession must have offered a
curious sight in this decade of the eighties. Heads of the Chambers of Commerce
movement in the state and of some of the state's most successful businesses marched
arm in arm with labor leaders, college presidents, and U.S. Senator Pell; and with
leaders of the Rhode Island State Nurses' Association; the Rhode Island Association
of Realtors; the Black Ministers Alliance; high school and college student council
associations; the Association of Mayors; the State Hospital Association; the state
chapter of Vietnam Veterans; the State Advisory Commission on the Status of
Women; and dozens of other groups. Even elderly representatives of the state's Asso-
ciation of Retired People and the Gray Panthers marched part of the way (they alter-
nated walking time with a bus ride that was provided for them).
The march was high-spirited, even though nearly everyone knew it was no longer
possible to influence the vote. The media coverage of the event symbolized the futility
of the effort and the failure to communicate. Two of the three local television sta-
tions, having been notified very late, failed altogether to report the march. An inter-
nal miscommunication led the third station to believe that the march would begin,
not end, at the Roger Williams Monument. That night, on its 6 P.M. news broadcast,
the station reported that a group of Compact supporters, looking very tired, had
gathered at the monument for five minutes, and, having decided not to hold their
march, had boarded some buses and left. The commentator, who was totally unaware
that a march had taken place, related the story in disgust. A headline the following
morning in the Providence Journal declared, "Greenhouse supporters brave heat
while public cools to the Compact."
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The Aftermath
The most important residual effects of the Greenhouse Compact are the positive rela-
tionships that were established among so many of the state's leaders and the common
understanding that has emerged about the state's problems and their solutions. Pieces
of the Compact have already been implemented in Rhode Island since the referen-
dum, and other pieces are likely to be implemented over time. In addition, officials in
many other states have studied the program and have been influenced by parts of it in
their own policy planning.
The people who worked on the Compact all had successful careers that continued
after it was defeated. None of them received any financial benefit from the Compact,
62 and none of them would have received such benefit had it been enacted into law. The
defeat of the Compact did not unfavorably affect their professional lives. Rather, for
those who participated, the pain of the defeat resulted from a strong feeling that
Rhode Island had missed a great opportunity. And it was our strong feelings about
Rhode Island and its people which had led us to initiate the effort in the first place.
Like the football player who is used to being successful but who causes his team to
lose an important game by dropping some crucial passes, we have only ourselves to
blame, ultimately. The people of Rhode Island made an understandable choice, given
the circumstances of the state and the way the Compact was structured and presented
to them. That is what is so disappointing.
Despite this, positive changes have already materialized in Rhode Island because of
our effort, and more changes are forthcoming. For this reason, and because the goals
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charged with conspiring to obtain money under false pretenses and with obtaining money under
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tenses and conspiring to obtain money under false pretenses. All of the above faced charges in
court on 13 November 1985.
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Regionalism: The Next Step
Ian Menzies
Although the New England states have, over the years, been regionally cooperative, they have
notformally advanced the process since the establishment of the New England Governors'
Conference in 1937. There is still no regional government in New England; no body politic that
can enact regionwide laws; no organization authorized to perform regionwide planning, or with
the power to regulate or direct growth and development or manage natural resources. There
isn't even a publicforum or assembly where such issues can be discussed. This article reviews
the history of regionalism in New England and proposes that the six states develop a more
mature approach to complex regional issues byforming a New England Council of
Governments.
Calvin Coolidge, as far as I'm aware, never said much about regionalism. Some say
he never said much about anything, but he understood very well the spirit of recalci-
trance and contrariness embodied in the New England psyche, which, on occasion, he
reflected with a wry wit. For example, we have the story of the day Coolidge and
some companions were standing beside a bridle path in Montpelier. A state senator
who never agreed with anyone or anything happened to ride by. Said Coolidge, turn-
ing to his friends: "Must bother him to be going the same way as the horse."
Contrariness, a New England characteristic intimately familiar to the Yankee Coo-
lidge, has, over the years, taken many forms, among them a disinclination by the six
New England states toward any extended degree of regional cooperation. Although
formal efforts to promote regionalism in New England go back some fifty years,
overall results have been less than distinguished. And, curiously, little has been done
to review or evaluate those efforts with an aim toward overcoming limitations
through an improved process.
Yet how can New England continue to enjoy both prosperity and livability without
a far more effective, systematized regional approach to growth, planning, increasing
densities, pollution, transportation, conservation of natural resources, and the inter-
nal distribution of people, services, and jobs? But first, it would be helpful to agree on
what is meant by regionalism, that is, as the term applies to a group of states rather
than to divisions within a single state.
Throughout this article, regionalism is considered a positive thing. It is defined
simply as the concept that those states which share a geographic identity may also
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share certain economic, social, cultural, and political characteristics which, through
cooperation, they can exploit to their mutual benefit. It is also reasonable to say that
the six New England states do form a fairly natural homogeneous grouping; that as a
whole this fact has been accepted by New Englanders; that efforts to think and act
regionally have improved in recent years; but that despite this progress there is, as
yet, no formalized regional agenda, assembly, or legislative process.
One would think that the need to formalize the regional process would be self-
evident. More self-evident, however, has been the lack of cooperation among the
states; a lack of cooperation that at times has devolved into bizarre bickering. Some
may remember the Battle of the Bottle back in the late 1950s, when Bay State tax
men would spy on New Hampshire's tax-free liquor stores, identify Massachusetts
buyers through the use of binoculars and hand signals, then nail Bay Staters for
unpaid liquor taxes as they reentered their home state. Updated versions of this
border tax war continue. Recently Massachusetts revenuers went after big-ticket hard
goods dealers who have warehouses in Massachusetts but retail outlets in New
Hampshire, where, free of a sales tax, they can undersell their Massachusetts
competition.
Taxes, indeed, have been a major aggravation between the New England states for
years, and not just sales taxes. Income taxes also have caused friction, because some
states have them (Massachusetts and Rhode Island), while others don't (New Hamp-
shire and Connecticut). The result, according to the Massachusetts Department of
Revenue, is that some Bay Staters who live along the border but work in Connecticut
or New Hampshire have avoided paying taxes to their home state, an evasion unfair
to their fellow citizens. That evasion, however, may now end, or at least be reduced,
as early this year tax officials of nine Northeastern states agreed to compare their
computer files in an effort to track down tax cheats— a good illustration of voluntary
regional cooperation.
But there are still many unnecessary conflicts fed by that old New England charac-
teristic that some call rugged individualism and others call illogical contrarinesss.
Why, for instance, do the New England states still have different rules and regulations
for the taking and selling of certain shellfish? Why different legal lengths for flounder,
cod, and haddock? And the variation in mesh size from state to state is not conducive
to the preservation of immature fish. Positive steps were taken in 1984 to standardize
minimal lengths for lobsters, soft-shell clams, and striped bass, but more has to be
done, especially in the interests of conserving overfished species, such as the food-
important black-back flounder. Surely the rules governing the taking of fish and shell-
fish, inshore and offshore, should be the same.
It's been much the same with the drinking age, with one state setting it at eighteen,
another at nineteen, and yet another at twenty-one. The outcome was predictable.
Thousands of teenagers, seeking drinking legality, simply drove across borders, thus
increasing the risk of highway tragedy. Not until quite recently, pressured by the
campaign of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), did the New England states
make a serious regional effort to agree on a uniform drinking age of twenty-one.
Vermont, however, as of late 1985, was still a holdout, with the Boston Globe report-
ing thousands of young people flocking into Vermont on weekends to drink or buy
beer or liquor, or do both. Vermont is finally expected to fall into line with the other
New England states this year under pressure from the federal highway administration,
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which has threatened to withhold highway funds from states that fail to raise the
drinking age to twenty-one by October 1986.
New England also has failed miserably in maintaining, let alone improving, inter-
state transit, where the need for collaboration and a united front is a prerequisite.
Think, for instance, how airline congestion could be eased both in Boston and New
York with the alternative of fast rail. New bullet trains wouldn't be necessary. What is
needed is completion of rail electrification between New Haven and Boston, along
with some new track, plus track straightening, completion of an updated signal sys-
tem, and, perhaps as much as anything, a single routing authority throughout the
length of the line, which would permit three-hour travel time between downtown Bos-
ton and downtown New York, thus providing a service that would be comparable to
^ current fast Metroliner service between New York and Washington. As of today it
looks as though Montreal's far-sighted, big-project mayor, Jean Drapeau, may suc-
cessfully promote three-hour fast rail between Montreal and New York before we
here in New England have three-hour rail between Boston and New York, even
though the distance from New York to Montreal is two hundred miles farther. 1
Fast rail between Boston and New York is the only way to reduce steadily worsen-
ing delays at Boston's Logan Airport, both in the air and on the ground. Logan's
multiplying problems, which, if allowed to continue, could eventually force a more
distant relocation of the airport, are directly tied to the fact that the Boston-to-New-
York air corridor is the busiest in the nation, with an incredible volume of 4.4 million
passengers annually. Despite this, the New England states haven't done nearly enough
to push for a competitive transit alternative to the New York shuttle. Yet a business
person, using three-hour rail, could, on many days, make it from downtown Boston
to New York faster than taking the shuttle would permit, a situation that will worsen
with mounting need for greater airport security.
There is also a major need, especially in the northern half of New England, to re-
store passenger rail to and through Boston to the south. In the densifying Northeast
corridor, the future for buses and cars will worsen, the result of mounting gridlock in
and around the region's cities. We are running out of capacity on our highways as
well as space to park at journey's end. Obviously New England should stop thinking
highways, even air, and instead think fast rail for both people and freight, thus pre-
serving airports for national and international travel. Fast rail is a regional challenge
that has been sidetracked by the New England congressional delegation, governors,
and state legislatures ever since it was derailed by the governor of Connecticut in 1971
because the proposed track realignment would have bypassed several coastal com-
munities then, and still, receiving service. And the way not to go, yet the way we're
going, is to build ever longer and heavier trucks (already up to fifty tons), along with
smaller and smaller cars— a suicidal policy. The day when entire families (five or six
people at a time) can be wiped out is already upon us.
Collective advances have been made on long-range power needs, some involving
Canada, as well as on the need to protect groundwater, which doesn't observe state
lines. And positive steps— including badgering the Reagan administration— have
been taken by the governors to find a compromise solution to the deadly dangers of
acid rain. But virtually no progress has been made in selecting a regional site or sites
for disposal of low-level nuclear waste, which New England produces in greater
volume per capita than any other region.
The picture is clear. There is no formal regionalism, with a couple of exceptions.
Most of what happens results from a handshake between the New England gover-
nors, or, as in the case of acid rain, because the issue beats on the heads of New Eng-
enders and kills the fish in their ponds and the trees in their forests. There are, it's
true, literally scores of organizations that have New England-wide interests in special
areas such as conservation, preservation, energy, medicine, water, and business, but
in the final analysis, in seeking regional unification, such organizations can operate
only on a state-by-state basis.
There is no regional government in New England; no body politic that can enact
regionwide laws; no organization authorized to perform regionwide planning or with
the power to regulate and/ or direct growth and development or manage natural
resources. There isn't even a public forum or assembly where such issues can be dis- ,_
cussed; where a consensus and constituency for regional proposals could be devel-
oped and an agenda generated. Instead what we have are special-interest regional
organizations, which, through congressionally approved compacts between two or
more of the New England states, have been delegated powers to form interstate
agreements. Existing compacts currently cover such areas as higher education, public
safety, flood control, and prisons.
The best known and perhaps most beneficial of these compacts is the one which, in
1955, established the New England Board of Higher Education and which was rati-
fied by all six states and the U.S. Congress. It is the purpose of the board to advance,
develop, and direct programs and activities that increase higher educational oppor-
tunities and that improve efficiency in the use of resources among New England's
academic institutions. 2 Since 1957, the board's Regional Student Program has made it
possible for more than fifty thousand New England students to attend out-of-state
public colleges and universities in the region at reduced tuition rates for specialized
degree programs not offered by in-state public institutions. Through this program, for
instance, a student in Maine, a state without a medical school, can attend one of the
New England state universities that has a medical school, at considerable savings over
private school costs. Currently, some five thousand students, each realizing an aver-
age tuition savings of more than $2,000, are enrolled in this regional program. It is
the largest such program in the nation.
It would be foolish, however, to take the board's continued existence for granted.
In 1982 Connecticut threatened to pull out of the compact— ostensibly to cut costs
—
but Governor William A. O'Neill strongly supported continuation, pointing out that
"More, not less, regional collaboration is needed in behalf of New England's growing
knowledge-intensive economy. . . . Board services link the research and manpower
training capabilities of higher education to economic development."3
The New England Board of Higher Education, headed by John C. Hoy, best
represents the type of effective, publicly beneficial organization that can be produced
by, as well as serve, regionalism. Its limitation is that it deals with only one facet of
New England life, albeit a critically important one: education. In fact, however, the
board has interpreted its mission of education liberally, and, quite sensibly, as the
only broad-based regional organization around, has expanded its activities to
regional economic studies such as job training and the New England economy per se.
It doesn't have to seek far for justification. Higher education is one of the most
important industries in New England. The annual expenditure of the region's 260 col-
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leges and universities is approximately $4 billion, and they generate about $10 billion
in revenues, which is close to 8 percent of the gross regional product. Currently under
way is a two-year study of the region's nine medical schools and teaching hospital
centers which aims to evaluate their role in the regional economy and their impor-
tance to the region's developing biomedical, biotechnical industries. The study is
being chaired by Dr. James M. Howell, senior vice president and chief economist of
the Bank of Boston who, although a Texan, knows more about the New England
economy than anyone else. In his view, the importance of these nine academic
regional health centers is absolutely pivotal to the long-term competitive strength of
New England. 4
One other effective regional organization, although in the private rather than pub-
lic sector, is the New England Council, which is made up of 1,200 member firms
—
banks, manufacturing companies, utilities, and so on—and employs over 1 million
New Englanders. Over the years, the council has both contributed to a positive
investment climate in New England and encouraged general economic growth.
Although self-interest lobbying hasn't always endeared it to liberals, the council has
taken broader stands as, for instance, in 1982, when it sought to set up a New Eng-
land Assembly, a sort of Aspen Institute-type think tank to focus on New England
issues. Curiously, to outsiders at least, the New England Council and the Massachu-
setts High Technology Council, representing 150 member firms with 240,000
employees— 130,000 of them in Massachusetts— have not seen fit to collaborate. The
High Tech Council, the newer group, obviously feels its interests are best served
through independent representation and, as of now, on a nonregional basis.
This brings us to the two umbrella political organizations which currently offer the
only forums in which to discuss and act, in a limited sense, on a broad spectrum of
regional issues. One is the New England Governors' Conference, established in 1937,
and the other is the much lesser known, more recent Caucus of New England State
Legislatures, formed in 1978. The Governors' Conference, which meets four times a
year, has a most competent but small staff of fifteen, headed by William Gildea, and
a current annual budget of $858,000 (based on $75,000 per state plus a per capita
contribution). The conference staff, based in Boston, does draw on various state
agencies throughout the region for help in research and analysis.
Areas of interest currently under discussion by the governors include energy, fish
(the boundary dispute with Canada on Georges Bank), acid rain, groundwater, low-
and high-level nuclear waste, and interstate banking. In addition to their four meet-
ings a year, the governors of the six New England states meet with the governors of
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania in an enlarged group known as CONEG
(Coalition of Northeast Governors). The New Englanders also meet with the premiers
of Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces—New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince
Edward Island, and Newfoundland—thus extending their interests and concerns to
the north, south, and west of New England itself. Energy and fish have been the prin-
cipal topics at meetings with the Canadian premiers. Groundwater was the subject of
the last CONEG meeting in August 1985, at which time the Northeast governors
urged the federal government not to cut back on waste-water treatment projects and
also urged it to set national standards for drinking water. At one of their meetings in
Springfield last fall, the New England governors learned, to their immense satisfac-
tion, that the Reagan administration had finally admitted the governors were right
about acid rain, that, indeed, it is formed by sulphates and that those sulphates
should, as far as possible, be eliminated.
However, the Governors' Conference, while showing a growing effectiveness, still
remains a policy-proposing rather than a law-making body. The conference's limita-
tions are obvious. Little can be achieved unless all six governors agree; even then, the
governors cannot pass any laws or allocate any funds. As in their own states, they can
only propose. It is up to the individual legislatures to dispose. The governors can and
do have an impact on setting policy, but the process, almost literally, is a handshake
operation.
Nor would the history of regionalism in New England be complete without refer-
ence to two additional organizations which, though now defunct, did play a role in its
advancement and which could, I suppose, like the phoenix, return reborn. The first
was the New England Regional Commission, spawned by President Johnson's Great
Society, one of eight federally sponsored agencies commissioned to revitalize areas
suffering from a lack of economic development. Of the eight agencies, first estab-
lished in 1967, only one— the Appalachia Commission— struggles on, underfunded.
At the same time, the feds also established the New England River Basins Commis-
sion under the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, its mission to plan for and
conserve water resources.
The New England Regional Commission was jinxed from the start, deadened by an
excess of political appointments. By 1972 it had become the subject of a newspaper
probe by the Boston Globe, which, among other things, described it as a "do-nothing
bureaucracy squandering millions of dollars in bookshelf studies."5 Before the com-
mission went out of business, however, a much more improved, more professional
staff produced a New England Regional Plan and Economic Development Strategy
that was substantive and that deserved implementation. The River Basins Commis-
sion, as opposed to the Regional Commission, worked smoothly and more profes-
sionally from the start and contributed a great deal to a New England-wide aware-
ness of the need to conserve water resources. It was an agency that, had it continued,
would have been more appreciated now than then. It was ahead of its time, which is
ideal for planning purposes but not from a political point of view. The agency with-
ered from lack of public and, in turn, congressional support.
President Carter, who, while governor of Georgia, had been at odds with the lead-
ership of the Georgia Regional Commission, in presenting his final presidential
budget declined to fund any of the nation's regional commissions. Appalachia was
excepted. The cuts were sustained by President Reagan. When the two New England
commissions died in 1981, the New England governors, wisely, approved the transfer
of staffers from the successful River Basins Commission to the Governors' Confer-
ence. Thus ended a well-intentioned national effort at regionalism, as well as some $8
million annually in federal funds which had been allocated to the two New England
commissions.
So, what we're left with is the Governors' Conference and the Caucus of New Eng-
land State Legislatures as the only two agencies with even a semblance of New Eng-
land-wide influence. But neither has legislative authority. What is needed today is a
breakthrough; an advance to a new plateau; a next step in regionalism. What should
it be?
This is an opportune time to think regionalism. New England is flying high. The
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National Planning Association predicts substantial population gains for both New
Hampshire and Massachusetts between now and the year 2000— a gain of 560,000
for Massachusetts and 373,000 for New Hampshire. And, according to the U.S.
Commerce Department, New England is today the richest region in the nation, with a
per capita average income of $14,421. Surely this is the time to plan a strategy that
will maintain the region's gains, conserve resources, and lessen the pockets of poverty,
whether rural, as in some of the sparsely populated northern counties, or urban, as in
cities like Hartford, Providence, New Haven, Boston, Lewiston, Springfield, and
Nashua. There is an enormous need for a New England-wide job training program
that can meet the changing demands of the region, from shoes and cotton to high
tech and biotechnology; a job training program that would develop a mobile work
force prepared to move to wherever jobs in the region arose. There is a need for
regional job fluidity, something that a new generation of schoolchildren should be
taught as a norm so as to avoid depressed cities and communities.
Equally important is the need to expand agriculture in New England, utilizing
greenhouses to extend the vegetable growing season while selectively reordering prior-
ities in the breeding of farm animals. New England imports nearly 90 percent of its
produce, 80 percent from California. There is a market here for fresher, tastier, less
artificially preserved foodstuffs and the technology to grow it year round, but a strat-
egy supported by all six states will be required to ensure effective marketing. With
water problems in the West, which could cut production and raise prices, it would
make sense for New England to become more self-sufficient in agricultural products.
The handling and marketing of New England's fresh-fish catch could also stand
improvement, and with new technology promising added shelf life, more fresh fish
could be exported to the Midwest, thus adding to the value of this industry.
With a critical shortage of low- and low-middle-income housing, it would make
sense to consider a public-private, independent regional authority to contract for and
build such housing (at volume cost savings) under a standardized, realistic building
code, especially as the federal government is distancing itself more and more from
subsidized housing. And the New England states also face an urgent need to desig-
nate sites for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, making use of whatever po-
litical trade-offs are required. New England, a major producer of low-level radioac-
tive waste, may soon find there is nowhere to put it, unless at prohibitive cost.
New England could obviously benefit from a more formal approach to regional-
ism, but to reach that next plateau will require that (1) a regional assembly or forum
be established, where issues can be debated publicly and constituencies formed to
support those issues; and (2) a political process be put in place which is capable of
producing, where appropriate, regional legislation.
Assemblies have been proposed before. In 1974, economist Rudolph Hardy, speak-
ing at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., proposed a New England
Assembly with the power to conduct regionwide planning. In 1981, following the ter-
mination of the two New England federal commissions, Hardy again proposed an
assembly at a special meeting of government, public, and private-industry officials
held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. His proposal failed to attract support.
An even earlier proposal for a New England-type Tennessee Valley (TVA) authority
was made by a regional planning committee at Yale University but also got nowhere.
Perhaps, using these failed proposals as a measurement, the soundest and safest
approach would be to expand on machinery already in place by forming a New Eng-
land Council of Governments. The council could be an enlargement of the present
Caucus of New England State Legislatures, formed in 1978, which is made up of
those persons who hold the six legislative leadership positions in each New England
state. In addition to the six legislative leaders from each state, additional legislators
could be appointed on a per capita state basis so as to form a broadly representative
regional body of eighty to one hundred members.
This expanded Council of Governments would consider proposals, in the form of
legislation, put forward by the proposed public assembly (a nonlegislative body), by
the Governors' Conference, and from the council's own initiatives. The council would
sit in session, in rotation, at each of the six State Houses for a fixed number of days
annually and would act on any proposed legislation. Bills that were approved would
be sent to the individual legislatures for consideration, where their chance of passage 7,
would be greatly enhanced because of prior approval by the regional body represent-
ing the legislative leadership of all six states.
This process would not encroach on states' rights, and it would provide a hereto-
fore nonexistent system of enacting regional legislation with greater speed and
regionwide understanding, both public and political. And, just as important, it would
provide a centerpiece where regional issues could be discussed and acted on. Fur-
thermore, there is no question that a meeting of the region's legislative leadership, on
a circuit-riding basis, would attract media attention, something sadly lacking up to
this time in regional affairs.
Endorsing the concept of more active participation by the New England legisla-
tures as a means to more effective regionalism, something he has long endorsed, Dr.
James Howell commented that the sooner we understand the need for this participa-
tion, the sooner we're going to be able to assure the long-term vitality of the region. 6
Equally significant, however, would still be the need for a grassroots public assembly
that could meet annually or biannually, also on a rotating basis, although at different
times from the Council of Governments (legislatures). The Governors' Conference
could maintain its present schedule of four meetings a year but perhaps hold one of
its meetings in conjunction with the council in order to maximize and centralize dis-
cussion of proposed regional legislation.
In a conversation in August 1985 with Andrew Card, Jr., the president's White
House assistant to the states, I asked him how the Reagan administration would react
to a stronger regional presence. "We would encourage it," he said, although by
"encourage" he was not suggesting a revival of the once federally funded regional
commissions. Card, who, because of his liaison with the states, is in a better position
than most to evaluate regionalism, says that the South has used the regional concept
to greater advantage than any other part of the country, adding, however, that New
England has one of the strongest cases for regionalism of all. 7
Shouldn't that case be tried . . . now? It's time for the next step.
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